4 faith a 'religion of democracy' and at other times 'romantic polytheism.' But both concepts bring together in a single vision his strong sense of 'social justice' and an appreciation for the sublime and the mystical."
9 Richard John Neuhaus concurs, noting that, "when Rorty gets his political wind up," he "portrays liberal democracy as a quasireligion." 10 Sounding almost preachy, Rorty writes, My sense of the holy, insofar as I have one, is bound up with the hope that someday, any millennium now, my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law. In such a society, communication would be domination-free, class and caste would be unknown, hierarchy would be a matter of temporary pragmatic convenience, and power would be entirely at the disposal of the free agreement of a literate and well-educated electorate.
11
Yet, as Boffetti admits, Rorty's development over the last decade of his life of this allegedly "spiritual" conception of liberal democracy continues to coexist with expressions of sympathy for the notorious Diderotian sentiment that the last king should be strangled with the entrails of the last priest. 12 In his final exchange with Stout, published posthumously, Rorty reiterates the robust commitment to secularism that he first voiced in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. He writes that, "Religion does indeed seem unlikely to wither away, but it is important to insist it would be better off if it did." 13 What are we to make of all this? Has Rorty made a "religious turn," as Boffetti suggests, or does he still maintain a highly skeptical and negative attitude toward religion? We can more easily understand Rorty's position by focusing on a theme that he 9 Boffetti, "How Richard Rorty Found Religion," 26. 10 John Richard Neuhaus, American Babylon (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 129. 11 Rorty, Future of Religion, 40. 12 Boffetti, "How Richard Rorty Found Religion," 24. 13 Richard Rorty, "Reply to Jeffrey Stout," in Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds., The Philosophy of Richard Rorty (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2010), 547. increasingly used to describe his pragmatic liberal project: anti-authoritarianism. This impelled Rorty to label his position on religion "anticlericalism" rather than "atheism."
Rorty's problem with religion is strictly political, not epistemological:
[Anticlericalism] is the view that ecclesiastical institutions, despite all the good they do -despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in despair -are dangerous to the health of democratic societies. Whereas the philosophers who claim that atheism, unlike theism, is backed up by evidence would say that religious belief is irrational, contemporary secularists like myself are content to say it is politically dangerous. On our view, religion is unobjectionable as long as it is privatized -as long as ecclesiastical institutions do not attempt to rally the faithful behind political proposals and as long as believers and unbelievers agree to follow a policy of live and let live. 14 Rorty can thus regard properly privatized religion with benign indifference. As a utilitarian pragmatist, he examines the social results of religious belief. He recognizes that religion offers psychological comfort to many believers, and often motivates them to actively promote policies that, perhaps coincidentally, advance liberal justice. Whatever
Rorty thinks of the plausibility of religious belief, he can support these results. What he objects to is the use of religion to obstruct the quest for liberal justice, and he suggests that such obstruction is particularly effective when endorsed by religious institutions.
Because Rorty recognizes that most religious believers do not separate their faith from their commitment to their churches in the way that he insists they must in order to be good liberal citizens, his "reconsidered" approach to religion does little to modify his hostility toward its traditional manifestation. His cooption of religious language to describe his "liberal utopia" is an effort to secure for his political ideal the passion that religious devotion often inspires, rather than a true rapprochement with traditional religion. In fact, he prefers to apply the adjective "romantic," rather than "religious," to 14 Rorty, Future of Religion, 33.
his passionate, imaginative, this-worldly hopes for humanity. But because postmodern theologians and philosophers of religion, like Tillich and Vattimo, have so expanded our notion of what counts as "religion," Rorty avails himself of their largess. He can, without too much irony, for example, suggest that hope for a future liberal utopia should replace faith in God as our Tillichian religious "symbol of ultimate concern." This rhetorical maneuver, however, should not be interpreted as Rorty gaining a greater appreciation for traditional religion. Indeed, if one reads carefully his "mea culpa" to Carter, it is clear that he doesn't backtrack an inch: Rorty's liberal politics will not finally tolerate religion that obstructs public progress toward his liberal utopia. Moreover, it seems that Rorty ultimately does not trust even a properly privatized religion to behave itself.
Rorty's position, of course, exercises religious thinkers like Carter and
Wolterstorff, who argue that their religion is essential to their democratic political reasoning. Nevertheless, at a time when many liberal theorists, in the name of toleration, endeavor to contort liberal commitments to render them more accommodating to nonliberal ways of life (usually by rendering those commitments unhelpfully vague), we should commend Rorty for his forthright admission that his liberalism clashes with the religiously informed political visions of Carter and Wolterstorff. Rorty writes that, for instance, "When we American college teachers encounter religious fundamentalists, we do not consider the possibility of reformulating our own practices so as to give more weight to the authority of the Christian scriptures. Instead we do our best to convince these students of the benefits of secularization." 15 This is, according to Rorty, the 7 "Jeffersonian compromise" that has generally kept religious conflict out of American politics. 16 Rorty recognizes that good liberal citizenship requires the development of an ethical character that will support liberal politics. He thus issues this hypothetical response to illiberal, religious parents:
There are credentials for admission to our democratic society, credentials which we liberals have been making more stringent by doing our best to excommunicate racists, male chauvinists, homophobes, and the like. You have to be educated in order to be a citizen of our society, a participant in our conversation, someone with whom we can envisage merging our horizons. So we are going to go right on trying to discredit you in the eyes of your children, trying to strip you fundamentalist religious community of dignity, trying to make your views seem silly rather than discussable. We are not so inclusivist as to tolerate intolerance such as yours. is not a truth-tracking cognitive faculty, as the Western philosophical tradition has often tried to characterize it, but is rather "a set of moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force. These are the virtues which members of a civilized society must possess if the society is to endure." 21 Although unaccompanied by much conceptual analysis, passages like these capture the very heart of Rorty's vision of liberal modernity. 29 I intentionally leave aside questions of when civil disobedience or political revolution might be justified, which would carry us too far afield. Suffice to say that I (rather conventionally) think that both of these responses can be justified along a continuum of increasing levels of injustice, with civil disobedience legitimately employed against reasonably heinous injustice and political revolution as the last resort against a badly unjust regime. These sorts of relatively extreme political activity are, in any case, generally (and hopefully) marginal in a reasonably just liberal democracy.
The liberal political settlement, of course, requires citizens who lose in the democratic process to abide by the law, even if they believe it to be unjust, even as they attempt to get the law changed by continuing the political debate. Thus, Jews and
Muslims in the Netherlands must abide by the law, regardless of how deeply it offends their religious sensibilities, if they are to remain a part of the political community.
Having a sense of irony about their religious beliefs that support ritual slaughter will 
II. Wolterstorff
Like other religious thinkers, Nicholas Wolterstorff criticizes Rorty's suggestion that religion is a "conversation-stopper" in democratic political debate, which leads to Rorty's misguided insistence that religion must be privatized and rendered publicly irrelevant to politics. For Wolterstorff, this privatization amounts to an undemocratic 30 is authoritarian -even when ostensibly employed to justify liberalism -and therefore tends to be hostile to pluralism and democracy. Rorty thus agrees with Wolterstorff's critique of liberal theories that purport to identify a priori and "neutral" principles that block religious reasoning from entering the public sphere. 34 Rorty instead argues that in order to be faithful to liberal values, we should understand liberalism as an evolving tradition of practices that cannot be given a final theoretical formulation. By endeavoring to construct just such a formulation, liberal political philosophers risk stifling the ongoing, free, and pluralistic conversation that is crucial to the progress of liberal politics. Instead, constraints on liberal politics emerge pragmatically and in media res, and crucially depend upon the liberal virtues of the deliberators.
Rorty argues that this pragmatic approach to liberalism both saves it from academic attacks on its alleged faulty philosophical foundations as well as making it more rhetorically appealing to nonliberals, who are rightly skeptical about questionbegging philosophical claims for liberalism's superior "rationality." Rorty suggests that,
If we Westerners could get rid of the notion of universal moral obligations created by membership in the species, and substitute the idea of building a community of trust between ourselves and others, we might be in a better position to persuade non-Westerners of the advantages of joining in that community. We might be better able to construct the sort of global moral community that Rawls describes in "The Law of Peoples." In making this suggestion, I am urging, as I have on earlier occasions, that we need to peel apart Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism. . . .
[G]etting rid of rationalistic rhetoric would permit the West to approach the non-West in the role of someone with an instructive story to tell, rather than in the role of someone purporting to be making better use of a universal human capacity. Wolterstorff's understanding of Christianity), or is at least more respectful of Christianity and of religious faith more generally. This is a citizenry that is in a sense more humble than Rorty's community of would-be, individualistic strong poets, because Wolterstorff's citizens recognize that, despite the liberty that their political community affords them, they are ultimately dependent on a loving God. Moreover, it is an America whose media and academic elites don't sneer at religious faith as the last refuge of the simple-minded.
Unfortunately, however, in his "Engagement With Richard Rorty," Wolterstorff fails to articulate this or any other plausible alternative because he fails to see the tension between the ethical requirements of liberal citizenship and the empirical practices of American religion and its institutions.
IV. Stout
Intellectual fellow travelers are often the most nuanced and creative critics because they, by definition, do not find one's ideas obviously wrong. proceeding arm-in-arm, working together to achieve a just society.
As we have seen, Rorty thinks the downside of the Falwells outweighs the upside of the MLK's. Stout, in contrast, lets his hope for MLK's eclipse his fear of the Falwells.
He writes, "My dream is to revive the sort of coalition between religious groups and secular intellectuals that I first experienced when I joined the civil rights movement as a teenager. Only by rebuilding such a coalition, it seems to me, are we likely to save American democracy from plutocrats and theocrats at home and abroad." 52 Rorty responds with complete agreement that this is the best case political scenario in the shortterm, i.e., at least for the "next couple of centuries," since religion isn't about to disappear in that timeframe. But he insists on the importance of pursuing "a long-term, militantly secularist, philosophical agenda," that will hopefully one day result in a "perfect while people in the first group may be genuinely vicious and unconvertible, the latter two groups, and especially group (3), might be reached and have their minds changed. 53 Rorty, "Reply to Stout," 549. 54 Stout, "Rorty on Religion and Politics," 531.
The way for a liberal to do this, according to Stout, is to show religious believers that one takes the details of the Bible seriously. Liberals should, for example, ask religious believers to explain why, if they take Leviticus as their basis for being against gay equality, they do not take other biblical passages literally, like Exodus 21:7, which permits a father to sell his daughter into slavery? 55 Stout contends that, if such believers are "confronted with the flimsiness of their reasoning," they are likely to change their minds, or else reveal themselves to be motivated merely by hatred and fear. 56 Rorty is therefore wrong to discourage religious reasoning in the public square; religious arguments for anti-liberal policies should rather be engaged head on.
Rorty, unsurprisingly, is less sanguine that such a Socratic ploy can, as it were, separate the sheep from the goats. After all, as Stout admits, "few people take themselves to be hateful or sadistic," and " [g] iven that rational entitlement [to one's beliefs] is context-sensitive and that relevant features of context vary from person to person, this sort of criticism is bound to be complicated business." 57 Rorty is famous, of course, for being a philosopher who doubts the power of "rational" argument, because interlocutors who deeply disagree with each other so often proceed from such different premises that they cannot but appear to one another to be begging the question. Committed religious homophobes will have rationalizations at hand for why some biblical passages must be interpreted one way rather than another. After all, the Christian tradition of taking some scriptural passages more literally and others more allegorically goes all the way back to Lastly, Stout attacks Rorty's hunch that that "nontheists make better citizens than theists." 60 Stout argues that this does not follow from Rorty's pragmatism, which looks to the practical consequences of belief. Theism, defined simply as belief in God, "involves no political implications whatsoever," and thus has no necessary connection to the quality of one's citizenship. 61 Indeed, Stout believes that Rorty pretty much concedes this point when he praises religious thinkers like Vattimo for adopting a version of theism that amounts to little more than the notion that God is love. Given that "bare theism" 58 Rorty, "Reply to Stout," 548. 59 Ibid. 60 Richard Rorty, "Comments on Stout's Democracy and Tradition" unpublished lecture delivered at the American Academy of Religion Annual Conference, November 23, 2003, Atlanta, Georgia. 61 Stout, "Rorty on Religion and Politics," 537.
does not necessarily lead to bad liberal democratic citizenship, Stout advises Rorty to avoid such sweeping generalizations and instead evaluate the political meaning of each set of beliefs on a case-by-case basis. 62 Stout tries to make sense of Rorty's seemingly unpragmatic anti-theism by attributing to him the assumption that theism must be accompanied by a distinction between the natural and the supernatural. This distinction opens the door to the sort of spectatorial conception of knowledge that Rorty has spent his career criticizing, because it suggests that there is a supernatural, "God's-eye view" of reality. This then inevitably leads to claims by some, e.g., priests and prophets, to have privileged access to this ultimate view, which causes problems for democratic political equality. 63 Stout notes that one finds similar lines of logic in Dewey and Hegel. He also asserts, without much discussion, that these arguments are simply not persuasive: there is no necessary dialectical direction from theism to authoritarianism.
Stout here puts his finger on the crux of Rorty's position. Rorty agrees with Dewey's pragmatist view that the "whole-hearted pursuit of the democratic ideal requires us to set aside any authority save that of a consensus of our fellow humans. . . . What
Dewey most disliked about both traditional 'realist' epistemology and about traditional religious beliefs is that they discourage us by telling us that somebody or something has authority over us." 64 This is, one must admit, an interesting suggestion. Nevertheless, it is easy to see why Rorty would demur if asked to extend the democratic political community to include a Supreme Being: a "partnership" between God and man hardly resembles the one that ideally holds between equal democratic citizens. Moreover, there is also the obvious problem that it is difficult to tell when God is deliberating with us and our fellow (human) citizens. As Rorty puts it, "As I see it, the whole point of pragmatism is to insist that we human beings are answerable only to one another. We are answerable only to those who answer to us -only to conversation partners. We are not responsible either to the atoms or to God, at least not until they start conversing with us." 69 If Rorty is correct that religion, and especially its institutions, tend to encourage authoritarian ideas and practices, then he is right to argue that it is not finally compatible with the secular ideals of liberal democracy.
V. Neuhaus
One might not initially expect a neoconservative Catholic priest to take Rorty Neuhaus begins by briefly rehearsing Rorty's well-worn historical narrative of how Western modernity arrives at its ideal denouement of his secularized liberal utopia.
Rorty writes:
I crudely sum up the story which historians like Blumenberg tell by saying that once upon a time we felt a need to worship something which lay beyond the visible world. Beginning in the seventeenth century we tried to substitute a love of truth for a love of God, treating the world described by science a quasi divinity. Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century we tried to substitute a love of ourselves for a love of scientific truth, a worship of our own deep spiritual or poetic nature, treated as one more quasi divinity. The line of though common to Blumenberg, Nietzsche, Freud, and Davidson suggests that we try to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything -our language, our conscience, our community -as a product of time and chance. 94 Just because the liberal ironist has no philosophically necessary reason for his public moral commitment to minimize cruelty does not mean his allegiance to it is weak. This is because the commitment is a matter of the liberal ironist possessing the liberal virtues, which enable him to best identify and work to eliminate cruelty.
The central theme of Rorty's Deweyan ideal is that self-creation and justice must be perpetually balanced and that philosophy cannot tell us a priori what that balance should be. As I described it above, Rorty's liberal utopia is communitarian: while there is always a healthy tension between the private experiments of the ironists and the public demands of liberal morality, the liberal ironist does not see the public and private as fundamentally opposed but rather as dependent upon each other. Neuhaus acknowledges that this is Dewey's conception of democracy but accuses Rorty of abandoning the "common faith" that holds Dewey's democratic community together. 95 And yet, like conception of liberal democracy, though one that is fully secularized. Rorty points out that the process of secularization has not resulted Western civilization's moral collapse but, to the contrary, has coincided with the development of history's most just and humane societies. This suggests to him that the further withering of religion is likely to promote further liberal progress.
Conclusion
When Rorty views the American political landscape, he notices that many people who espouse political beliefs that are contrary to his ideal of liberal society understand those beliefs to be grounded in their religious faith. Moreover, he thinks that these problematic beliefs are often actively and effectively promoted by the churches these people attend. Indeed, Rorty believes this has generally been the case in human history.
John Stuart Mill has long been quoted as observing that while not all conservatives are stupid, most stupid people are conservative. Likewise, Rorty's position on religion might be summed up: while not all religious believers are antiliberal, most antiliberals in liberal society are religious believers.
Yet believers like Wolterstorff, Neuhaus, and Vattimo seem to belie Rorty's connection between religion and antiliberal politics. As Stout would insist, each is thoughtful, nondogmatic, and even ironic in their responses to Rorty; they eminently exhibit the liberal virtues. But they are also, of course, highly idiosyncratic. While
Wolterstorff insists that he and Rorty embrace "profoundly different comprehensive perspectives," when we read their eminently civil and eloquent debate, we might be excused for wondering just how ethically different they actually are in practice. (As philosophical stalwarts of the elite American academy, could they really be that different?) Fr. Neuhaus insists that, "The radical mode of contingent existence that Rorty prizes would seem to be much heightened by a Christian eschatology that, unlike Rorty's, is falsifiable (after all, it is hypothetically conceivable that Jesus will not return in glory). 96 But how many Christians who are prone to bringing their religious beliefs into the public square are likely to admit such a possibility? Rorty plausibly suspects that such Christians devote themselves to the faith precisely in order to quash such doubts.
What drives Rorty's position that religion must be privatized in the short-term, and wither away in the long-term, is his belief that the only public authority that should be recognized in a pragmatic liberal community is the evolving, deliberative consensus of citizens who possess the liberal virtues. Religious and metaphysical beliefs are perennially a threat to this vision because they suppose something nonhuman that might require something of us. Religion is not "irrational." It has historically sometimes produced good things, like art, moral action, and happiness. But because secular commitments can equally produce such good things, religion is simply not worth the risk.
We should refrain from imagining that there is something larger than us that is responsible for us and that we are responsible to. Rorty writes:
If we give up this hope, we shall lose what Nietzsche called "metaphysical comfort," but we may gain a renewed sense of community. Our identification with our community -our society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage -is heightened when we see this community as ours rather than as nature's, shaped rather than found, one among many which men have made. In the end, pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right. James, in arguing against realists and idealists that "the trail of the human serpent is over all," was reminding us that our glory is in our participation in fallible and transitory human projects, not in our obedience to permanent nonhuman constraints. 
